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Introduction 
The Lozi/Barotse i  kingdom was colonized and partitioned by Britain, Germany and 
Portugal from the late 19th century onwards. Its political and economic heartland along 
the floodplains of the upper Zambezi fell under British rule in 1890. Until Zambian 
independence in 1964, the territory was administered under the name Barotseland as a 
more or less integral part of the colony of Northern Rhodesia. In 1969 Barotseland was 
renamed the Western Province of Zambia. The German- and, after 1914, British- and 
South African-ruled part of the former Lozi kingdom became the Caprivi Region of 
Namibia at independence in 1990. In August 2013, the Namibian government announced 
a name change to Zambezi Region.  
 
Western Province and the Zambezi Region have more in common than their precolonial 
Lozi history and the Zambezi river, which demarcates most of the shared border of the 
two sovereign states they are part of. Both areas have given rise to separatist movements. 
Short-lived incidents of militant secessionist action have constituted major national crises 
both in postcolonial Zambia and Namibia. This chapter addresses both cases of Lozi 
separatism in a comparative fashion. 
 
In the run-up to Zambian independence the British government, the Lozi leadership, and 
the Zambian transitional government signed the 1964 Barotseland Agreement. The treaty 
spelled out the terms under which Barotseland would be incorporated into the Republic of 
Zambia: as a province with far-reaching autonomy and special powers for the Litunga 
(the Lozi King) and his elaborate administrative apparatus of induna (headmen) 
assembling in various kuta (formal decision-making councils of headmen) on regional 
and local levels under the heading of the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE). A 1969 
decree by the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) under President 
 
 
Kenneth Kaunda to change the name of the territory to Western Province added insult to 
injury to the Lozi leadership. Soon after independence Kaunda’s government had also 
reversed most of the special regulations in the 1964 agreement. Kaunda’s decision had 
some support among the younger generation of Lozi migrants who had left Barotseland to 
work in the mines and urban centres of Southern Africa, and who had adopted the 
Zambian nationalist stance represented by Kaunda’s UNIP. From the BRE’s point of 
view, however, this amounted to an open abrogation of a legally binding treaty and 
caused irreparable damage to the good faith in which they had voluntarily signed the 
1964 agreement. Since then, the Lozi leadership has consistently demanded more 
political autonomy and the reinstatement of the 1964 agreement. That itself is not a 
secessionist demand. However, politically radical minority groups among the Lozi, and in 
so far two instances of acute crisis also within the mainstream of BRE all the way to its 
Ngambelaii, have openly argued for the secession of Barotseland/Western Province from 
Zambia as a measure of last resort. 
 
In the Caprivi Region, a secessionist movement gained momentum in the mid-1990s and 
on August 2nd 1999 a radical core group launched an armed attack against Namibian 
government installations in Caprivi. The movement’s mastermind Mishake Muyongo and 
other leading members belong to a lineage of regional headmen, who had been originally 
appointed by Litunga Lewanika in the 1880s to administer this peripheral, but 
strategically important, former province of the Lozi kingdom. As one aspect of their self-
legitimation, Muyongo and his associates have consistently highlighted what they call 
“cultural” and “historical” differences to the ethnic groups inhabiting the rest of Namibia, 
especially the Oshivambo-speaking majority. Significantly, this goup constitutes the 
bedrock support for Namibia’s ruling party, the former liberation movement South West 
African People Organisation SWAPO (United Democratic Party 2005). The Caprivi 
secessionists thus used implicit references to Lozi history for their own political ends. 
They did not succeed in establishing an independent state of Caprivi and instead their 
rather pedestrian actions of August 1999 were quickly and violently crushed by the 
Namibian security forces. The leadership of the secession has since then died, fled into 
exile, or been arrested and put on trial for high treason in controversial Namibian court 
 
 
cases bogged down by endless technicalities. But the issues which drove Caprivi 
secessionism have continued to stir debate and political confrontation in Namibia into the 
present day.  
 
The Caprivi secessionist attacks in August 1999 caused 15 deaths as a result of combat 
actioniii and this number was exceeded by those dying in detention in the ensuing trials. 
The attacks constitute the most severe national political crisis Namibia has faced in its 
post-independence history and resulted in the first and so far only declaration of a state of 
emergency. Concerning Barotseland, it has been the explicit wish of the majority of the 
Lozi leadership, including their radical factions, to secede by peaceful means instead of 
guns. The Lozi line of argument has consistently been a legalistic one, ceaselessly 
insisting on the contractual facts (and their own interpretation) of the 1964 agreement. 
The following tableiv is useful in comparing and gauging the significance of the two 
cases.  
 
 area in km2 % of national population % of national 
Western 
Province 
126,386 16.8% 881,524  6.8% 
Caprivi/Zambezi 
Region 
14,785 1.8% 90,100  4.2% 
 
 
Western Province’s size and population is roughly 10 times that of Caprivi/Zambezi, but 
both are home to a similar share of inhabitants of the nation’s overall population. Both 
territories are undoubtedly of significant importance for their countries in terms of 
geostrategic and socioeconomic value, in particular transport access, water, timber and 
land for cultivation. 
 
The question arises whether separatism by Lozi-speakers in both Zambia and Namibia 
constitutes evidence that a people divided by colonial boundary- and state-making has, in 
 
 
the postcolonial period, been reunited in opposition against the inclusion of its ancestral 
lands in the two respective independent states. Are both separatist movements at least 
partially motivated by a shared wish to re-establish the greater Lozi kingdom? Our 
answer to both questions is a clear “no”. And this is exactly why we feel that comparing 
both cases in one single chapter is interesting. Both cases have precolonial roots in the 
former Lozi kingdom. They share the experience of colonial partitioning by the same 
boundary, of indirect rule through hierarchically organized Lozi-speaking authorities in 
the area, and the borderland population continues to have close kinship ties today. In our 
view, however, supposedly deep-rooted ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ identities and grievances, 
which are often cited as reasons for the radicalisation of political opposition in Africa (Cf. 
Lemarchand 1972; Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010), do not offer an adequate framework 
to understand and compare separatism in these two parts of the former Lozi kingdom. We 
will instead highlight a number of reasons why the two separatist movements did not join 
in a united cause of pan-Lozi nationalism, despite their shared roots. We group these 
reasons into four thematic clusters: 
1. A different status of what is now Western Province and the Caprivi/Zambezi Region in 
the precolonial period of the Lozi kingdom, and the consolidation of this difference by 
colonial boundary-making and administration. 
2. Different times and circumstances of the processes of decolonisation in Zambia and 
Namibia and, related to these, differences in secessionists’ claims of 'betrayal' by their 
respective postcolonial governments. 
3. Different regional and national politics in the postcolonial era for each case with 
different roles of the local actors in or vis-à-vis the central state. 
4. Differences in the way the post-colonial state authorities in both countries have reacted 
to expressions of separatist agendas at different times. 
We argue that those with a separatist agenda on both sides have never united behind a 
pan-Lozi secessionist cause because they involve descendants of rather different people 
arguing over fundamentally different issues at different times and under different 
circumstances. The two cases we examine tell two rather distinct stories of opposition 
against postcolonial state formation, despite their shared roots in one single case of 




As we have indicated, in both cases actors at the centre of the respective secessionist 
movements derive some or most of their legitimacy from claims to represent traditional 
authority. We will give further details regarding the background and relevance of these 
claims, but there is no room for a deeper engagement with the academic debate on 
traditional authority in general or in Caprivi and Western Province in particular (cf. Zeller 
2007a, 2007b, 2010; Melber 2009). For the record, our use of the term ‘traditional’ 
throughout this chapter incorporates the element of creative (re-) invention of so-called 
‘tradition’ by actors with vested interests, with an expressed understanding by these 
actors of themselves as both representing continuity of the past and as being able to 
evolve and adapt in the present (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Mamdani 1996; Forrest 
2004).  
 
Our chapter will first outline the historical processes through which the Lozi kingdom 
was partitioned and gradually transformed into Barotseland and the Caprivi Strip during 
the colonial period. We will then examine how decolonisation planted the seeds of Lozi 
separatism in Western Province and the secessionist movement in Caprivi, and how these 
evolved after Zambia's and Namibia’s independence. A final section will trace the initial 
thawing and subsequent renewed freezing of relations between successive central 
governments and separatists in the Zambian case, as well as the high treason trial and 
further contestations which defined the aftermath of the Caprivi secession in Namibia 
from the 1999 attacks until the time of writing. 
 
The Birth of the Kingdom in the Floodplain 
Territories outside Zambia’s Western Province, in particular in Western Angola and 
North-eastern Namibia, have previously been under the waxing and waning rule of 
Bulozi (the Lozi kingdom) to a considerable though varying extent. Lozi oral history and 
current scholarship locate the origins of their ancestors among the Luyi people of the 
Katanga Region of present-day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). From there a 17th-
18th century migration led the Luyi groups to the upper Zambezi’s fertile floodplains, 
which could support a relatively high population density. Through military defeat and 
 
 
assimilation of other population groups living in the floodplain and its hinterlands, the 
kingdom gradually grew into a complex patchwork of intermarried kinship and language 
groups. Some were masters, some were servants with varying degrees of status and 
loyalty to one or several competing Luyana power centres in the floodplains. From there, 
the Luyana kings steered an increasingly sophisticated political economy through an 
elaborate network of senior chiefs and their councilors (Mainga 1973; Caplan 1970; 
Gluckman 1959; Trollope 1937, 19; Flint 2003). 
 
An invasion by the Kololo people reached the Luyana kingdom in the early 1840s. It 
resulted in a political and cultural cross-fertilization, from which the root of the Lozi 
kingdom and its lingua franca Silozi emerged. After the demise of the Kololo in the 
1860s Bulozi remained in turmoil for the next two decades. In 1884, however, Lubosi 
Lewanika, born into one of the Luyana royal lineages, emerged as a new leader with a 
strong and ruthless hand. After killing off his main rivals Lewanika embarked on an 
elaborate project of administrative reforms and the careful crafting of a unified Lozi 
nation and state with himself as the sole and sovereign Litunga (Gluckman 1955, 1965; 
see also Sumbwa, 2000). Trade, tribute, slave labour and raids on the kingdom’s 
peripheral groups soon became insufficient to sustain the cost of the sprawling 
administrative system and royal grandeur that went with the strengthened centre. By the 
late 1880s Barotse royalty increasingly relied on the goods, revenue and skills acquired 
from European traders, frontiersmen and missionaries in exchange for hides, ivory and 
the granting of permanent settlements (Caplan, 1970; Mainga, 1973, 139). Bulozi’s 
volatile southern provinces Sesheke and Linyanti gained importance as a gateway for the 
Lozis engaging the Europeans and their entrepreneurial, technological and military 
resources (Flint 2003, 402-410; Mainga 1973, 132f; Gluckman 1941, 96). Lewanika had 
a robust administrative arrangement to secure these strategic areas: At the town of 
Linyanti, inside what is today the Caprivi/Zambezi Region, he placed Simataa Kabende 
Mamili, a tried and tested ally. At today’s town of Mwandi in Western Province’s 
Sesheke District, he placed his own son Letia. 
 
Engaging the Europeans: British and German Interests in Bulozi 
 
 
Following the counsel of French missionary Francois Coillard, on 27 June 1890 
Lewanika signed a treaty with Frank Lochner, an agent of Cecil Rhodes’ British South 
Africa Company (BSAC). The so-called “Lochner Concession” was later amended by 
several follow-up contracts. Their conditions were more lenient than those the BSAC 
offered any other indigenous rulers in what is present-day Zambia (Caplan 1969). Bulozi 
became a British protectorate exempted from white settlement and with a large degree of 
autonomy in administration and taxation (Mainga Bull 1995, 5). BSAC’s resources were 
thinly spread across southern Africa and diplomacy was a more realistic strategy than 
coercion. Rather than an imposed colonial yoke, Lozis today regard Litunga Lewanika’s 
alliance with the British as a mature voluntary decision, which provided a degree of 
internal stability Bulozi had not seen during most of the 19th century (Flint, 2004, 119). 
However, Lewanika did enter into an irreversible process, gradually trading the 
kingdom’s sovereignty for political-military protection by the British (Mainga 1973, 
171). Between 1890 and 1893, Anglo-German and Anglo-Portuguese contracts in effect 
truncated Lewanika's territory, initially without the knowledge of the Litunga. 
 
On 1st July 1890, only four days after the Lochner Concession, the British and German 
governments signed the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty.v With the so-called Caprivi Strip 
(named after the German chancellor in office at the time), one of the most recognizable 
legacies of colonial boundary-drawing on the map of Africa was created. The so-called 
“access corridor to the Zambezi”vi was motivated by ambitious German hopes to establish 
a viable transport connection from the protectorate of Deutsch Südwest Afrika (DSWA) 
via the interior of Southern Africa to the German territories in East Africa. DSWA also 
needed water and labor resources, which seemed available in great abundance via the 
access corridor. Reality soon grounded such colonial fantasies. The distance and terrain 
between the established German outposts and the Zambezi were simply too challenging. 
Lewanika’s appointees Mamili and Letia continued to administer and extract tribute for 
themselves and the Litunga. After an arduous three-month journey through the Kalahari 
the German flag was finally hoisted in February 1909 by Hauptmann Kurt Streitwolf at a 
place he named “Schuckmannsburg” after DSWA’s governor at the time. vii  To his 
superiors, Streitwolf reported Caprivi had no valuable minerals, a dangerous climate for 
 
 
European settlement but a moderate potential as a labor reserve, albeit restricted by the 
difficult transport access (Streitwolf 1911, 229-234).  
Like the Germans, BSAC initially had only speculative interests and limited 
administrative muscle in their part of the Lozi kingdom. The company’s main objective 
was the maintenance of order in a large territory with minimal financial input (Mainga 
Bull 1996, 5; Mainga 1973, 161; Caplan 1970, 74-118). The first decade of mutual 
engagement by the Lozi and the British consolidated the power of Lewanika’s inner 
circle of power and his administrative setup, thereby resulting in increased political 
stability for the heartland of Bulozi and considerable material wealth for its ruling elites. 
The Lozi leadership were not only passive recipients of the power projected outward by 
the British colonial system but creatively engaged the colonizers for their own personal 
advantage. More fundamental changes were to come, however. 
 
From Remote Hinterlands to Labour Reserves 
BSAC saw Barotseland as unsuitable for white settlement. Its key assets were a large 
native labour force and linked potential for tax revenue. The Lozi leadership was willing 
to cooperate and strong enough to control an ethnically diverse range of subject people 
via feudalistic power and ownership structures. In 1903, BSAC divided Barotseland into 
five districts with resident District Commissioners commanding an armed native police 
force of ca. 600 men. In the following years, they formally abolished slavery and 
introduced a hut tax. Lewanika grudgingly settled for a ten per cent share of the revenue, 
a small portion of which would trickle down to lower-level chiefs at his own discretion 
(Caplan 1970, 86f). The material base of the Lozi elites thus shifted from direct 
extraction of tribute and labour to monetary income allocated to them by the British 
authorities. The broader Lozi population had to find sources to earn cash income. The 
conditions were set for labour migration and by the early 1910s thousands of Lozi men 
were working in the mines, on commercial farms and the railway lines in the Rhodesias 
and South Africa (Van Horn 1977, 164; Gluckman 1941, 164). Lozi royalty increasingly 
adapted to the luxuries and etiquette of a European lifestyle as their offspring were 
educated in missionary schools and groomed to take their place in the bureaucracy of 
Indirect Rule (Mainga 1973, 206). In 1911, the Company amalgamated the existing 
 
 
territories of Barotseland-North-Western-Rhodesia with Northern-Eastern-Rhodesia to 
establish the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. Barotseland’s relative administrative 
autonomy continued, but BSAC kept the province as a largely rural native reserve, from 
which taxes and labour for industrial production, and from 1914 onwards for the war 
effort in East Africa, were extracted (Mainga Bull 1996, 6). 
 
Upon his arrival in the Caprivi Strip, the most delicate task for Hauptmann Streitwolf was 
the setting up of a functioning administration with minimal resources in this large and 
remote territory. He eventually managed to convince the population that they were now 
under the protection of the German Kaiser, and no longer required to deliver labour or 
tribute to the Lozi leadership on the other side of the Zambezi (Streitwolf 1911, 110). 
Inspired by the British system of Indirect Rule, the German resident confirmed Chief 
Mamili as the representative leader of the inhabitants of the western parts of Caprivi, 
mainly the Mafwe people and several associated - but importantly rather distinct - subject 
groupsviii. Streitwolf then oversaw the appointment of Chief Chikamatondo as a caretaker 
for the eastern parts inhabited by the Masubiya people. The affirmation of the Mafwe 
chieftaincy and the creation of the Masubiya chieftaincy broke the existing chain of 
command and allegiance between the previously subordinate peoples in Caprivi and their 
Lozi overlords. These events affirmed the partitioning of Bulozi along the colonial 
boundary from a mere line on maps to a fact of daily life. Chiefs Chikamatondo and 
Mamili had seized the opportunity to safely dissociate themselves from Lozi rule and 
build their own power base. Apart from this legacy, effective to this day, the results of 
German colonial rule in Caprivi are rather modest. On 21st September 1914, the 
commanding officer at Schuckmannsburg surrendered to advancing British forces, ending 
the brief period of Germany’s actual administration of the Caprivi Strip. 
 
After Lewanika’s death in 1916 his son Yeta III became Litunga, a position he held until 
1945. BSAC’s rule in Barotseland ended in 1924 when the Colonial Office took over the 
administration of the British Protectorate Northern Rhodesia. After intensive lobbying by 
Yeta III, Barotseland was granted a special status and officially declared a protectorate 
within a protectorate (Mainga Bull 1996, 6). As large-scale industrial mining took off in 
 
 
the Copperbelt in the late 1920s the economic centre of gravity within Northern Rhodesia 
shifted further away from Barotseland and contract labour migration increased. In the late 
1920s the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) and other labour bureaus 
were hiring thousands of men who worked and lived in ethnically segregated 
communities in all major mining centres of South Africa and the Rhodesias. In some 
districts, Lozi-speakers amounted to as much as half of all able-bodied men (Caplan, 
1970, 145). In 1936 the Barotse Native Authority (BNA) was established with a treasury 
and far-reaching responsibilities in the fields of land- and natural resource management, 
jurisdiction and law enforcement. Owing to its considerable administrative capability, the 
powers of the BNA were greater than those granted to any other Native Authority within 
Northern Rhodesia and this remained unchanged until the end of the British colonial 
period. 
 
The Conference of Versailles brought the Caprivi Strip, along with the rest of South West 
Africa (SWA), under the League of Nations Mandate handed to South Africa. Between 
1919 and 1939 responsibility for the administration of all or parts of Caprivi was passed 
back and forth several times between South Africa, SWA, Bechuanaland and Northern 
Rhodesia. This illustrates both the low priority and the continuing difficulties to access 
the territory during that period. However, the League of Nations continued to consider 
Caprivi as part of SWA. In 1937 a new administrative centre was established near the 
Zambezi’s Katima Mulilo rapids. In 1939, administration of the eastern Caprivi Strip was 
once again transferred, this time to South Africa. The strategic location of the strip in the 
heart of southern Africa was central to Pretoria’s interests at the outbreak of the Second 
World War (Kangumu 2000; 2011). Caprivi was declared a Native Reserve and from 
1940, the South African Defence Force (SADF) used the first airfield at Katima Mulilo 
for training exercises while WNLA used its own aircraft to transport Caprivi men to the 
mines near Johannesburg. Caprivi remained inaccessible over land from the other parts of 
SWA until the mid-1960s. The government in Pretoria perceived the Caprivi Strip as 
unsuitable for white settlement, sought to minimize expenditure, encouraged labour 
migration, and implemented its policies via indirect rule through the Mafwe and 
Masubiya chieftaincies under the supervision of one white government officer. The 
 
 
borderland population throughout this period maintained close relations across the 
Zambezi and elder residents today recall that the border was virtually open. As in 
Barotseland, and in contrast to SWA the language of schooling in Caprivi was English, 
both provinces worshipped in Silozi and ran their clocks on the same time zone as the 
surrounding British colonies South Africa: one hour ahead of SWA. Like Barotseland, 
Caprivi’s status as a remote province run through special administrative arrangements 
was thus consolidated. 
 
 
What Kind of Independence? South African Bantustan and Zambian Province 
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was imposed in 1953 against the expressed 
opinions of the majority of its black population. Under the leadership of Mwanawina, a 
son of Lewanika and highly controversial Litunga, the Lozi leadership however gave its 
lukewarm support for the federal scheme (Caplan 1970, 168ff). In return, Barotseland’s 
special status as a protectorate was further entrenched by an Order-in Council of the 
British Government (Mainga Bull 1996, 9; Caplan 1968, 346f). 
 
By the late 1950s the Lozi leadership had become accustomed to actively cultivating their 
self-image of Barotseland as an independent state. This stance was nevertheless 
increasingly irreconcilable with the realities of Zambia’s approaching independence and 
rising black African nationalist sentiments. Educated Lozis and labour migrants had 
become politically sensitized and openly questioned the sole authority of the Litunga and 
his leadership apparatus, which was reeling from internal succession disputes at the time. 
Conservative British forces meanwhile regarded sustaining the Lozi leadership as the 
solution to stave off popular demands for black self-rule in the colony (Caplan 1968, 
350f; Mulford 1967, 212ff). Under these circumstances nationalist forces gained the 
political upper hand in Barotseland in the run-up to independence. Educated Lozi 
candidates of Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP overwhelmingly defeated the Barotse National 
Party sponsored by Litunga Mwanawina in three successive elections in 1962, 1963 and 
1964 (Sumbwa 2000). The weakened Lozi leadership embarked on a two-pronged 
strategy: They focused on securing the autonomy of Barotseland within an independent 
 
 
Zambia while secretly attempting to strike deals with old allies in sympathetic colonial 
administrations in South Africa, Rhodesia, Portugal and France. In an attempt to increase 
BNA’s revenue base Litunga, Mwanawina’s nephew Lubita was sent to Johannesburg to 
negotiate a raise in WNLA’s attestation fee for Lozi workers. WNLA were at the time 
recruiting 5-6000 Lozi men annually to work in the Rand mines. Lubita also conducted 
negotiations in March 1964 at Katima Mulilo with representatives of South Africa’s 
Verwoerd government over military and financial assistance to “free” Barotseland from 
Zambia (Caplan 1968, 355). What looks like an attempt to create a Barotseland 
Bantustan, probably including Caprivi, and thus re-uniting a large share of the Lozi 
kingdom, did not become a reality. Instead, the Lozi leadership accepted the 
incorporation of Barotseland into the independent state of Zambia under the terms of the 
Barotseland Agreement 1964. This document was the result of three-party negotiations 
between the BNA, the British and Northern Rhodesian governments. It was signed in 
London on May 18 that year by UNIP’s president Kenneth Kaunda, Litunga Mwanawina 
and Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys. UNIP promised to 
recognise the special status of Barotseland beyond Zambian independence and to 
preserve the Litunga’s powers to make laws over a wide range of regional and local 
government matters in Barotseland. These included land and natural resource 
management, the judiciary and finances. The Barotseland Agreement 1964 was however 
not formally enshrined in the new republic’s constitution and therefore technically a legal 
document of inferior relevance (Mainga Bull 1996, 12). 
 
In the months before Zambian independence Kenneth Kaunda gave written and verbal 
assurances that his government had “no wish to interfere with the day to day running of 
the internal affairs of Barotseland”.ix Yet, after independence on 24th October 1964, the 
UNIP government no longer concealed the fact that they intended to do away with what 
they regarded as a reactionary colonial anachronism (Caplan 1968, 356). The BRE was 
then and is still today an elaborate and vast network of chiefs from the various Lozi royal 
lineages and their bodies of senior advisers with duties in specific resorts like land 
management, jurisprudence and ceremonial affairs. It is an administrative system using 
all the signature elements and symbols of state bureaucracy: stationery and flags, 
 
 
uniforms and administrative buildings, written permits and formal meetings held in 
official languagesx, security forces and official holidays.  
The ruling UNIP party’s strong electorate and their nationalization of the copper mining 
industry provided the muscle to strip the Lozi leadership of much of their formal fiscal 
and administrative powers. The British parliament briefly debated the abrogation of the 
agreement in December 1966 but the position of the Labour government at the time was 
“once a country becomes independent these matters become issues for its own internal 
decision”. xi  By 1969 all major institutions of Barotse administration were either 
dismantled or had their funding streams re-routed through Lusaka. The salaries of the 
Litunga and the royal family were now paid by the president’s office. Kaunda’s 
administration also prohibited all further recruitment by WNLA in Bulozi. With its two-
thirds majority in parliament, UNIP in 1969 amended the constitution to cancel the 1964 
agreement and rename “Barotseland” as “Western Province”. Fast-paced development in 
the Copperbelt, Lusaka, and along the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) 
train route to Dar es Salaam were shifting Zambia’s economic and political centre of 
gravity further away from the Zambezi. Cash-crop plantations and other ‘white elephant’ 
projects introduced by central government in Western Province were incompatible with 
the floodplain ecosystem and became bogged down in the day-to-day resistance against 
government policy by Lozi administrators on the ground (Flint 2004, 167f).  
 
In some sense, the situation for Western Province under UNIP was not unlike the earlier 
relationship between BSAC and the Lozi leadership. UNIP did little to develop the area 
while a small group of high-ranking and well-educated Lozis were receiving state salaries 
and appointments to ministerial positions or parastatal companies, sufficient to 
discourage them from full-blown opposition to central government. A marked difference, 
however, lay in the role of Lozi ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’. The British authorities had 
carefully sustained and re-invented ideas and administrative practices of precolonial Lozi 
authority to maintain social stability as part of Indirect Rule in Barotseland (cf. 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The Zambian government sought to relocate and isolate 
them from the realm of everyday administration into a sphere of depoliticised ‘folklore’. 
This project was never completed. In the absence of efficient state structures the Lozi 
 
 
system of administration continued to play a central role in many aspects of daily life in 
Western Province, in particular the management of land and its natural resources. The 
controversy over the 1964 agreement remained unresolved.  
 
By 1964, domestic and international pressure was mounting on the South African regime 
to extend development and greater administrative and political autonomy to its black 
population. For Caprivi, the Odendaal Commissionxii recommended a roadmap towards a 
self-governing homeland and with great financial input, Pretoria began to implement 
ambitious development plans. As Zambia gained independence, Katima Mulilo became 
the fast-growing designated seat of a future Caprivi bantustan government. These plans 
were not unopposed though. The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) had been 
formed in 1963 with the purpose of achieving self-government for the Caprivi Strip. Like 
their fellow Lozi-speakers from Barotseland, many of the early CANU members had 
formed ideas of black emancipation while abroad as migrant labourers or on education 
programs. Not surprisingly, the apartheid authorities closely watched CANU’s activities. 
Its first president Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye was arrested in 1964 and subsequently 
held in detention at various locations in SWA before he disappeared entirely in 1972 
under dubious circumstances (Flint 2004, 174; Kangumu 2011, 214 ff). Another leading 
figure of CANU was Albert Mishake Muyongo, a prominent young member of the 
Mafwe royal family and direct descendant of Simataa Mamili (Fisch 1999,42).  
Following Simbwaye’s arrest and a bloody crackdown on a CANU meeting at Katima 
Mulilo, Muyongo and other CANU activists fled to Tanzania and Zambia. In November 
1964 they met with Sam Nujoma and other leading members of SWAPO in Dar Es 
Salaam and discovered they were fighting for a common cause: independence from white 
minority rule for the territory of the former German colony DSWA. Muyongo agreed to a 
SWAPO-CANU merger and thereafter held various positionsxiii in SWAPO before he was 
expelled in 1980. Myongo’s 1964 move was partially consistent with the stated wish by 
Simbwaye, expressed in a letter he managed to secretly send in 1968 from detention in 
Warmbad to the Zambian government. In this letterxiv, he explains that his motivation to 
form CANU was “not to start a secessionist movement” that would push for Caprivian 
independence separate from the rest of SWA, but that his intentions differed from those 
 
 
of SWAPO in that he was advocating against the use of violence to liberate the country, 
not what country should be liberated. 
 
The internal politics within SWAPO in exile were at the time strongly driven by (not 
unfounded) fears of assassinations and covert operations by South African and other 
security and intelligence agencies. SWAPO had originally emerged from the 
Ovamboland People’s Organization (OPO), a contract worker based movement. This 
Northern, most densely populated part of SWA was home to more than half of the 
country’s total population. External threats and inner pressure from a younger generation 
of militant activists joining the organization in exile challenged SWAPO’s established 
leadership from the early 1970s onwards. The organisation’s inner circle developed 
mistrust against non-Ovambo members. Muyongo became one of many victims of the 
liberation struggle’s internal power politics. He nowadays maintains that he and SWAPO 
President Sam Nujoma on 5th November 1964 signed a document formally sealing the 
SWAPO-CANU merger on condition that Caprivi would be granted either special 
political status or complete autonomy after Namibia’s independence (United Democratic 
Party 2005; Flint 2004, 188). Muyongo claims to have a copy of what could be called the 
‘Caprivi 1964 agreement’ but says he will only produce it “when time spells for the right 
opportunity”.xv SWAPO disputes this claim and conclusive or convincing evidence has 
never been produced by either side. According to the website of the secessionist 
movement, the document contains among others the following clause: “At the attainment 
of independence, the people of the Caprivi must be asked whether they want to join 
Namibia or remain independent” (Caprivi Freedom 2013). This contested issue became a 
key reference point in the allegations of betrayal made by the Caprivi secessionist 
movement in the late 1990s. 
 
Despite the emerging political opposition, the apartheid regime’s push for development in 
Caprivi continued through the 1960s with significant projects in all sectors of public 
service and infrastructure. The Strip finally became accessible by road and in 1969 postal 
and telegraph services were directly connected to South Africa. The East Caprivi 
homeland was finally inaugurated in 1972, while the western part of the strip between the 
 
 
Mashi and Kavango rivers was declared a nature reserve. Four years later the Caprivi 
bantustan was granted self-government and its name changed to “Lozi”. A government 
was formed, complete with a constitution, regulations for Lozi citizenship, a national 
anthem, and a state flag depicting two elephants. These were supposed to symbolize the 
Legislative Council consisting of the Mafwe and Masubiya chiefs, their Ngambelas and 
ten councillors each (South Africa 1964). The council’s de facto powers were very 
limited, and all important funding and policy decisions were made in Pretoria. 
The wave of developmental change rolling over Caprivi from 1964 onwards was from the 
outset accompanied by the apartheid regime’s political and military strategic concerns. 
These gradually came to take centre-stage after SWAPO’s military wing launched a 
guerilla insurgency in Caprivi in the late 1960s. South Africa responded with a heavy 
build-up of military installations and troops. By the late 1970s the rear bases and main 
operations of SWAPO’s guerrilla war had shifted to southern Angola. Although Caprivi 
remained strategically relevant, the apartheid regime’s ability to sustain the costly efforts 
introduced during the 1960s decreased as the security-driven development paradigm lost 
its momentum. Governmental services in Caprivi contracted and Pretoria transferred the 
administration of Caprivi back to SWA in 1980 when legislation established a three-tier 
system of local, regional and central “ethnic” government. After elections Caprivi’s 
Second-Tier Legislative Assembly was composed equally of Masubiya and Mafwe 
councillors. A rift over the supposedly rotating chairmanship soon emerged between the. 
two sides. Although it was settled in court shortly before Namibian independence, the 
ethnic animosities in Caprivi were to continue (Fosse 1996; Kangumu 2011).  
 
In 1989 a negotiated settlement between the United Nations, the South African 
government, and SWAPO paved the way for Namibia’s independence on March 21st 
1990 (Cf. Melber and Saunders 2007). In the first free elections in November 1989 
SWAPO emerged as the strongest party with 57 per cent of the overall votes nationally, 
while the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) received 29 per cent. DTW had been 
established in the 1980s as an umbrella for black political organisations with the blessings 
of the apartheid authorities. Mishake Muyongo had returned from exile in 1985, formed 
 
 
the United Democratic Party (UDP) and soon afterwards merged it with DTA. He thus 
became a DTA member of Namibia’s first independent parliament. 
 
In December 1972 a constitutional amendment act declaring a one-party state under 
UNIP marked the beginning of Zambia’s Second Republic. By its end in 1991 Zambia's 
economy contracted by over 30 per cent (Virtual Zambia 2008). Key reasons were gross 
mismanagement of the copper industry and a dramatic fall in the world price of copper. 
Throughout this period Zambia also supported liberation movements throughout southern 
Africa and consequently lost its access to the ports of Durban and Maputo. Zambia took 
major loans from commercial banks overseas and the World Bank, which defaulted in the 
mid-1980s. Banks and donors pressured the Zambian government to re-introduce 
multiparty democracy and implement a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). 
Attempts to follow suit met with internal opposition and the deteriorating economic 
situation led to food riots. As UNIP’s power was waning in the late 1980s Kaunda made 
several attempts to appease the Lozi leadership. In 1988 he appointed Litunga Ilute to the 
Central Committee of UNIP. This and other moves in the run-up to the multi-party 
elections of 1991, however, failed to secure Kaunda the necessary votes to win the 
elections. 
 
Calls to Arms: Rising Separatism in the 1990s 
The winner of Zambia’s 1991 parliamentary elections, the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD), announced in its campaign manifesto: “We are committed to a 
policy whereby traditional rulers regain the enjoyment of their traditional powers. The 
institution of chieftaincy shall be given its rightful and respectable role, drawing support 
from government” (MMD 1991). After years of Kenneth Kaunda’s dogmatic rejection of 
traditional leaders’ role in government these were re-emerging as important players in 
rural and national governance during the presidency of MMD’s Fredrick Chiluba. The 
reformed 1996 constitution created a national House of Chiefs to act as an ‘advisory 
body’ to the government. President Chiluba also secured the support of selected 
individual chiefs (and their voting subjects) through the distribution of personal gifts in 
the form of cars and cash (Times of Zambia 2003, 31 January). An overwhelming 
 
 
majority of the Lozi electorate had voted for Chiluba and MMD in 1991. Party 
campaigners had led the Lozi leadership and broader population to believe that an at least 
partial restoration of the 1964 agreement would be conceivable under their government 
(Englebert 2005, 29-59; Sumbwa 2000, 115f). These expectations were thoroughly 
disappointed. In early 1993 the MMD government officially recognized a Nkoya chief in 
Kaoma, considered by BRE a renegade province trying to break away from the Lozi 
umbrella (Mainga Bull 1996, 8; Sumbwa 2000, 116). During the same period the fallout 
from SAPs and a general breakdown of public services throughout the country were 
sorely felt in Western Province. Zambia experienced political turmoil as the Chiluba 
government persecuted a senior member of the Lozi royal family on dubious high treason 
charges. In early 1995 parliament passed a new law aimed to strip BRE of its power to 
allocate land. Despite the 1969 Land Act, BRE had never ceased to execute this function 
and continued to extract a significant part of its revenue from it (Sumbwa 2000, 117).  
Already in July 1993 some 5000 Lozis had assembled at the Litunga’s residence 
demanding to challenge the Zambian government in court with the aim to secede the 
province based on the 1964 agreement. President Chiluba had refused to enter into 
dialogue and instead promised to crush any uprising. In July 1995 tensions came to a 
head when the presidential motorcade was blocked by stone-throwing Lozis upon a visit 
to Mongu, the capital of Western Province. In preparation against expected government 
retaliation, Lozis from all districts followed a ritual call to arms and formed a militia to 
protect their Litunga (Sumbwa 2000, 119f). During ensuing raids state security forces 
seized rocket launchers, anti-aircraft guns, hand grenades and land mines from radical 
Lozi separatists. Government alleged these had been obtained from UNITA forces in 
neighbouring Angola (Minorities at Risk 2003). The Lozi leadership reacted by 
convening a Barotse National Conference (BNC) in November 1995. The BNC is the 
highest decision making body of BRE and only convened on extraordinary occasions. It 
passed a resolution demanding government recognize the 1964 agreement and 
incorporate it into the constitution. The resolution text further threatened “if the 
government continues to be obstinate, the people of the Barotse shall have the right to 
self-determination by reverting to the original status of Barotseland before 1964” 
(Barotse National Conference 1995). Importantly, BRE and its highly trained lawyers did 
 
 
not directly threaten with secession but pointed out that they were considering their 
options. Despite the clash between BRE and the MMD government, neither side 
implemented their threats in full. Government did not give in to Lozi demands regarding 
the 1964 agreement, but the implementation of the Land Act remained superficial. BRE 
did not renege on its demands for the restoration of the 1964 agreement, but did not 
proceed to challenge the MMD government in court either. While claiming that 
Barotseland had a right to secede from Zambia, BRE publicly rejected the idea of 
pursuing the secessionist option by force. Litunga Ilute Yeta stated “we shall not secede 
from Zambia” while simultaneously denouncing the government for its “perpetual 
enslavement of Barotseland” (The Post 1994; Englebert 2005). The Litunga and his 
Ngambela distanced themselves publicly from demands made by more outspoken 
agitators for Lozi separatism. They instead chose to ally with their former enemy, 
endorsing Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP in the 1996 elections. Some junior Lozi royals and 
associated activists continued to take a more radical stance but eventually toned down 
their rhetoric as the political climate cooled off once again. Among these, Prince 
Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika who in 1996 contested the Zambian presidential 
elections on a moderately separatist platform publicly endorsed the Caprivi separatists’ 
cause in 1999. Possible direct links or material support for Muyongo’s movement had not 
been credibly established, however, and seemed never to be part of the BRE’s public 
rhetoric (Englebert 2005; compare with Mbikusita-Lewanika 2001; Barotse Patriotic 
Front 2004). 
 
In the run-up to Namibian independence expectations of rapid economic change as a 
dividend of the end of apartheid were high among the black majority population. In the 
first elections in 1989 the Namibian population voted the SWAPO party to power with a 
strong majority in most regions except Caprivi. Here DTA held on to a slowly declining 
majority vote in all elections until the 1998 local authority elections. Mishake Muyongo 
had become the party’s leader in 1992, and in 1994 ran for president against Sam 
Nujoma.xvi Caprivi was Muyongo’s personal power base where a group of educated and 
politically active Caprivi men formed around the veteran politician. Many of these had 
spent their formative years in training and employment for Caprivi’s apartheid era 
 
 
administration. For them, Namibian independence was yet to deliver the material and 
symbolic benefits they had experienced during the bantustan period. Muyongo’s support 
in Caprivi was, however, roughly split along the region’s ethnic divide which Streitwolf’s 
recognition of two chieftaincies had helped to create and which regional politics during 
the bantustan period had deepened:xvii The Mafwe under their chief Bwima Mamili, a 
cousin of Mishake Muyongo were largely voting DTA while the Masubiya generally 
supported SWAPO. In the post-independence climate of competition for scarce 
opportunities within Caprivi the existing rift soon broke out more openly and turned 
violent (Fosse 1996,165-8; Flint 2004, 244, 66). Mafwe residents alleged that the 
distribution of government employment and other benefits unfairly favoured the 
Masubiya population and other supporters of the ruling party from outside of Caprivi 
(Fosse 1996,165). Muyongo and his followers claimed that ‘tribalist’ attitudes among the 
core leadership and voters of SWAPO, as well as post-independence politics in Caprivi 
were the continuation of the Ovambo dominance Muyongo and others allegedly had 
experienced in exile (Fisch 1999, 20). The politics of the independence struggle thus 
continued. 
 
Another issue of hot contestation emerged soon after independence: The recognition of 
chiefs in Caprivi by the SWAPO government. Streitwolf’s administrative arrangement 
based on a separate Mafwe and Masubiya chieftaincy had essentially functioned 
continuously since 1909. In the case of the Masubiya, a rather coherent identity and 
internal hierarchy had been constructed and continues to exist to the present day. The 
Mafwe chieftaincy was less homogenous from the start. Several groups with more or less 
clearly pronounced ideas of a separate identity traced their existence back to the times 
before 1909 (Compare with Streitwolf 1911, 126). In August 1992, a Mafwe breakaway 
faction unilaterally elected their own chief. Violent confrontations soon took on a party-
political dimension as the SWAPO government officially recognized the new Mayeyi 
chieftaincy. Eager to beat the main national opposition leader’s party on his home 
ground, SWAPO ran a powerful campaign in Katima Mulilo in the 1998 local authority 
elections and overturned DTA’s previous majority (Soiri 2002, 201). Muyongo alleged 
irregularities but failed to take legal action. Instead, he and his supporters questioned the 
 
 
inclusion of Caprivi in the Namibian state formation project and began to openly identify 
with an alternative: The idea of a separate and sovereign Caprivi state within the borders 
of the earlier bantustan. While Muyongo’s own statements never indicated a wish for this 
state to become part of a resurrected Lozi kingdom (see also Flint 2003, 427) the Lozi 
heritage provided a powerful background in terms of which secessionists could label 
alleged ‘Ovambo invaders’ as ‘foreigners’. Leading members of the secessionist 
movement had been educated and groomed for careers in the administration of the 
Caprivi bantustan. Both the kingdom’s and the bantustan’s lingering histories appear to 
have provided fertile ground for the secessionists’ ideas to take root at a time when the 
Namibian state formation project had not yielded the results they desired. 
 
After the 1998 election defeat these ideas ripened and led to organised action. Namibian 
security forces discovered a training camp of the newly formed Caprivi Liberation Army 
(CLA) in a Mafwe-dominated area of Caprivi near the Botswana border later that year. 
The largely Oshivambo-speaking security force members used heavy-handed methods on 
the civilian population in the surrounding region in their search for suspected members 
and sympathisers of the CLA. Allegedly escaping torture, rape and intimidation, some 
2500 people subsequently fled to Botswana where they found shelter in the Dukwe 
refugee camp. Mafwe Chief Bwima Mamili as well as Mishake Muyongo and Caprivi 
Governor John Mabuku were among them. Mamili and Muyongo were soon transferred 
to Denmark as political refugees under UNHCR protection, while several hundred others 
were voluntarily repatriated to Namibia in the following months. A majority remained in 
Botswana, however, and a hard core of several dozen CLA members managed to regroup 
on Angolan and Zambian territory. On 2nd August 1999 they launched poorly 
coordinated armed attacks on government installations, such as the national broadcaster’s 
station and airport in Katima Mulilo. Although they were caught completely by surprise, 
the Namibian army and police quickly regained control. In total, fifteen casualties 
(Namibian security forces, rebels and civilians) were officially recorded. President 
Nujoma declared a state of emergency for the region, which lasted for three weeks. 
Namibian state security forces were pursuing and interrogating suspect secessionist 
sympathizers throughout Caprivi. Hundreds of arrests were made in- and outside 
 
 
Namibian territory, involving torture and unauthorized extradition in several cases 
(Amnesty International 2003a). The Caprivi secession had failed and the radical core 
members of the movement were either dead, in exile or in custody. But while the new 
Millennium in some respects brought a new deal to both the Namibian and Zambian parts 
of the former Lozi kingdom, the grievances which underpinned separatism in both areas 
did not simply go away. 
 
Contestation Continues 
On May 13th 2004, a new road bridge across the Zambezi at Katima Mulilo closed the 
last gap in a 2524 km-long asphalt route called the ‘Trans Caprivi Corridor’ (TCC), 
connecting Zambia’s Copperbelt with Namibia’s sea-port of Walvis Bay. The bridge and 
refurbished sections of the TCC were largely financed by foreign donors but gave the 
governments of Zambia and Namibia an opportunity to showcase their commitment to 
bringing economic development to the rural provinces following the separatist incidents 
in the previous decade. While the new infrastructure and investment opportunities 
provided the backdrop for a political reapproachment between BRE and the new MMD 
administration of Chiluba’s successor Levy Mwanawasa (cf. Zeller 2007b, 2010) during 
his period in office (2002-2008), the SWAPO government of Namibia showed no signs 
of compromise regarding its tough stance against the Caprivi secessionists.  
 
Caprivi/Zambezi 
After their arrest in the aftermath of the August 1999 attacks, the more than 140 
imprisoned Caprivi secessionists were charged with high treason and 274 other counts. 
Among the accused was a remarkable portion of teachers and other educated former civil 
servants. The authorities initially refused to provide legal aid for the accused but the 
Namibian Supreme Court ruled in mid-2002 that they were entitled to adequate legal 
representation at the expense of the state. The treason trial finally opened in 2004 and 
after numerous delays the prosecution closed its case in mid-2013. The delay in judicial 
procedures collides with Article 12(1)(b) of Namibia’s Constitution, which stipulates that 
trials should “take place within a reasonable time, failing which the accused shall be 
released”. Several bail applications by some of the accused - motivated by deteriorating 
 
 
health conditions and the need for special medical treatment - were refused. During the 
trial, the number of prisoners who died in detention exceeded the death toll during the 
attacks. 
 
In early August 2003, Amnesty International published a critical report on the treatment 
of the detainees (Amnesty International 2003a). It expressed deep concern about the 
violation of pre-trial rights of the accused, which might undermine their right to a fair 
hearing as defined in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). It 
observed violations against the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the failure of the authorities to 
investigate and prosecute allegations of torture. AI expressed concern over the misuse of 
the “common purpose” doctrine under which all the defendants were charged among 
others with high treason, murder and sedition. In a press release it called on the Namibian 
authorities “to immediately and unconditionally release all prisoners of conscience and 
ensure that the remaining defendants are tried in a fair manner” (Amnesty International 
2003b). 
 
The Namibian government instead continued with the uncompromising full prosecution 
of the accused. It has also shown no willingness to address the political root causes of the 
separatist attempt and instead treated it as an issue of maintaining law and order. The 
SWAPO government’s method of trying to eliminate political challenges through 
declaring them illegal is also evident in their decision to ban, with effect as of the 1st 
September 2006, the revived UDP which promotes self-rule in Caprivi (afrolNews/IRIN 
2006). 
 
In February 2013, 43 of the accused in the high treason trial had been dismissed as a 
result of lack of evidence. The acquitted have launched legal action suing the government 
for compensation, amounting close to N$ 1.2 billion in total (Menges 2013). From the 
originally 143 accused 12 were released prior to the opening of the trial in 2003, another 
one in August 2012. 22 accused died while in custody, 10 among these between their 
 
 
arrest and the opening of the trial. Of those remaining accused, 13 identified as 
ringleaders refuse to recognize the jurisdiction over them (Analysis Africa 2013).xviii Ever 
since the trial started, the secessionists’ agenda of a separate Caprivian State continued to 
make occasional headlines in the Namibian press.xix The main trial finally ended with a 
verdict on 8 December 2015. Of the remaining accused, around 30 were found guilty and 
received long jail sentences, while most others had their charges dismissed. Many of 
them had spent up to 16 years in prison. The judge harshly criticised the police for using 
torture to force those arrested to implicate others and to confess. Since then, several 
among those found not guilty, have laid charges against the Namibian state and claim for 
compensation.   
 
Refugees that had been living in the Dukwe camp in Botswana since the late 1990s were 
gradually returning to Namibia with the assistance of both the UNHCR and the Namibian 
government. But despite appeals by the Namibian Commissioner for Refugees close to 
one thousand refugees were at the end of 2013 still reluctant to accept the offer and 
preferred to stay in Dukwe (Sankwasa 2013). Until mid-2016 the repatriation process 
proceeded slowly and with interruptions. It was marred by suspicions among those who 
had fled that upon return they might be punished. By 2017, still some 900 refugees had 
remained in the Dukwe camp. Namibia’s state budget for 2017/18 allocated more than 10 
million Namibian Dollar for their repatriation (Sasman 2017). A few political asylum 
seekers were also living in Australia, Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the United States. 
Upon enquiry of some of these they were informed that the government’s willingness to 
provide returnees a home without prosecution would be strictly limited to Namibian 
refugees registered with the UNHCR in their host countries and not to asylum seekers 
(Namibian Sun 2013).  
 
Mishake Muyongo continues from his Danish exile home at the outskirts of Copenhagen 
to execute leadership as president of the UPD through a virtual, albeit distant presence 
with annual New Year messages on the party’s website, including appeals to continue the 
“struggle to liberate the Caprivi Strip”.xx But in recent years others have increasingly 
 
 
taken on the task of pronouncing themselves on behalf of UDP, not least as members of 
an exiled group resident in and operating from Canada.  
 
Although it has been declared illegal, UDP remains active in Caprivi. It now explicitly 
denies having a secessionist agenda and currently demands: 1) a political dialogue 
between Namibian President Pohamba and UDP president Muyongo; 2) the 
unconditional release of all Caprivi political prisoners; and 3) a referendum on the 
Caprivi political dispute (without any specific definition of ‘the dispute’ or the nature of 
the ‘referendum’). It insists on using only peaceful means and emphasizes its wish to 
“prevent the recurring of 2nd August 1999”.xxi In April 2012 UDP activists planned a 
demonstration in Katima Mulilo with the aim to hand a petition stating the above 
demands to the Caprivi Governor. The petition also made reference to the shared 
historical roots of Caprivi and Barotseland, claiming that both became part of their 
respective countries without the consent of their inhabitants. It did not, however, argue 
for a re-united Lozi kingdom. Permission for the planned demonstrations and demands 
was categorically denied by the Namibian authorities but they are continually debated in 
(largely closed or anonymized) social media fora and letters to newspaper editors. xxii  
 
The internal logic of a former guerrilla movement organized through a military hierarchy 
and chain of command, and its fear of enemy infiltration still appear to be central to the 
way many of Namibia’s ruling party members work and think today.xxiii Over two and 
half decades after independence an unofficial view is widespread from the national 
leadership down to the party foot soldiers that the SWAPO party, the Namibian 
government, and the Namibian state are identical and indivisible. According to the 
official paradigm, SWAPO has “brought democracy”xxiv as well as “development and 
progress” (The Namibian 2008) xxv  to Namibia, and any form of opposition is 
undermining the “peace and unity” needed for the nation-building project to continue. 
 
Consistent with this logic is the SWAPO government’s announcement in August 2013 to 
re-name the Caprivi region ‘Zambezi’. While the responsible government minister 
described the decision as an articulation of “the wishes of the people” there was 
 
 
significant, though not unanimous opposition within the region against the name change 
(Mutenda 2013). This is consistent with findings that, across ethnic, political and 
generational lines within the region “Caprivian” exists as a category of self-definition 
which also includes a sense of being “different”, though not necessarily separate from the 
rest of Namibia (Guijarro 2013). The name change accordingly struck many as an 
offensive external imposition. A newly formed “concerned group” alleged at a press 
conference in Katima Mulilo on 20 August 2013 that the name change “is destined to 
destroy our identity and history” (Sanzila 2013). Similar concerns and objections were 
raised in this and similar letters to the local print media: 
 
Being a Caprivian is our identity, culture, and way of life; it is who we are as a 
people sharing similar cultural norms and social values. (…) The word Caprivian 
is what unites the (…) tribes of the Caprivi. This is similar to the Ovawambo, 
though they are amongst themselves OvaKwanyama, OvaNdonga, OvaMbalantu 
etc. They find unity and pride in being commonly known as Ovawambo. (Ngoshi 
2013)  
 
An opinion article observed “the people of Caprivi accepted that name as part of their 
collective historical memory and remembrance; its colonial origin notwithstanding”. He 
claimed that colonial history is part of the country’s collective history. “One cannot just 
erase it by using tippex” and “‘Caprivi’ will remain a contested territory” (Kaure 2013). 
The editorial in a local weekly suspected “that the reasons for changing the name Caprivi 
have less to do with its colonial roots than the symbolism it holds for secessionist 
sympathies in the region.” (The Windhoek Observer 2013) 
 
Barotseland/Western Province 
After his election in 2002, Zambia’s President Mwanawasa earned back the majority of 
Lozi votes for his MMD party, by directing investments and warm rhetoric towards 
Western Province. The thawing of relations between Zambia’s central government and 
BRE was commented upon in 2004 by Inyambo Yeta, a direct descendant of Lewanika 
and senior Lozi chief of one of the seven administrative sub-units of BRE. Yeta was at 
 
 
the time vice-chairman of Zambia’s Constitutional Reform Commission, as well as 
chairman of the Zambian House of Chiefs, and had been appointed to both positions by 
the president:  
President Mwanawasa [. . .] is a personal friend of mine. We both are lawyers. 
That does not necessarily mean that there is recognition of the institution I 
represent. The minute you get a chief who is not in good books with the president, 
he will be just ignoring the Royal Establishment and say: “Oh no, those people 
there, we don’t have any time for them (Inyambo Yeta interview, 14.6. 2005). 
 
Yeta’s assessment proved to be accurate. The National Constitutional Conference set up 
by Mwanawasa rejected the submission by BRE to reinstate the 1964 agreementxxvi and 
following Mwanawasa’s death in office in 2008 relations under his successor, MMDs 
Rupiah Banda turned back to confrontational. On 14th January 2011 the first violent 
clashes occurred since 1995 between Lozi activists and security forces in the provincial 
capital Mongu, resulting in two deaths and numerous injuries. 120 persons were arrested 
on treason charges and jailed for up to nine months. Among them was the 92-year old 
former Ngambela Maxwell Mututwa, who died soon after his release from prison.xxvii 
Lozis, both radical and moderate, were outraged but on 10th February a high-powered 
Lozi delegation led by Chief Yeta met with President Banda to assure him that BRE had 
no intention to secede from Zambia, stressing that the 1964 agreement was not a 
secessionist issue but one of negotiated terms of integration.xxviii 
 
Michael Sata and his Patriotic Front (PF) party won Zambia’s 2011 elections and Lozi 
activists allege that while on the campaign trail in Western Province Sata promised to 
restore the 1964 agreement if elected. Yet once in power, the president rejected the 
findings of a commission of inquiry into the 14th January 2011 riots as well as the 
restoration of the 1964 agreement. Echoing the crisis of the mid-90s, Lozis accused Sata 
of “consciously calculated electoral deception”xxix and on 26th and 27th March 2012 some 
2000 delegates attended a Barotse National Conference at Limulunga. Their resolution 
stated: “Barotseland is now free to pursue its own self-determination and destiny. We are 
committed to a peaceful disengagement with the Zambian government”. xxx  The 
 
 
conference resolution declared that they now accepted successive Zambian government’s 
consistent failure to heed the 1964 agreement and, since Barotseland had only become 
part of Zambia on the conditions stipulated in this document, they were in fact not 
seceding but merely confirming the non-existence of a union between the two. The 
establishment of a Barotse Government, complete with defence forces, ministries and 
various other bodies were also decided, and soon thereafter a mushrooming of websites 
and pages on facebook and other social media indicated that these decisions had at least 
some results in the virtual world. While the conference could hardly have taken place 
without at least passive tolerance by Litunga Lubosi Imwiko II (in power since 2000), the 
royal palace soon started taking a different line. The Ngambela who had presided over the 
2012 Barotse National Conference, Clement Wainyae Sinyinda, resigned his position in 
November 2012, citing lack of protection from the office of the Litunga. He was arrested 
on treason charges on April 14th 2013, the same day President Sata visited the Litunga at 
his residence. Hardline Lozi secessionists accused the Litunga of treachery and openly 
threatened with regicide, a highly unusual but not unprecedented event in Lozi history. 
These and other developments have exposed existing rifts between different factions 
within BRE and a number of separatist groups in Western Province. Many of these 
differences have deep roots and echo the pre-colonial diversity and internal divisions of 
the Lozi kingdom. 
 
For a large share of the non-Lozi Zambian public, events throughout the first 5 decades 
after independence have led to a widely held opinion that the Lozis in Western Province 
are in essence tribalists living in their own imagined past of lost glory, that their internal 
and separatist politics are fundamentally pre-modern and cannot be taken seriously. Still, 
the political grievances and the seasoned Lozi lawyers who express them through legally 
sophisticated language have not only outlasted the 50th anniversary of Zambian 
independence in October 2014. They have since become part of what could be called the 
new Zambian political mainstream of deep political division expressed by all sides 
through references to ethnic and geographic distinction of a perceived ruling 
Bemba/northern regime against the south and west of the country. Edgar Lungu took over 
the leadership of the PF party following Sata’s death in October 2014 and in presidential 
 
 
by-elections in January 2015 narrowly defeated UPND candidate Hakainde Hichilema. 
Since then, the space for open political debate in the country has shrunk dramatically. A 
large share of the electorate, opposition leader Hichilema, and several election 
observation missions have not accepted the officially proclaimed outcome of the August 
2016 presidential elections, which again saw Lungu narrowly ahead of Hichilema (by a 
2.68% margin). Since then, there have been well-documented allegations of collusion 
between PF and the Electoral Commission, important parts of the free and independent 
press have been stifled by arrests, court cases and expropriations targeting journalists and 
editors. In a bizarre road rage incident in April 2017, the presidential and opposition 
leader’s respective motorcades were racing each other en route to the annual Kuomboka 
ceremony in Mongu. Both had been invited by Litunga Lubosi Imwiko II, who continues 
to be widely unpopular among the Lozi electorate. Lungu subsequently had Hichilema 
arrested from his home at night and jailed on high treason charges for endangering the 
life of the president. In June 2017 the president of the Zambian Catholic bishops’ 
conference and other senior religious leaders publicly decried “the muzzling of people’s 
freedoms and human rights violations”, and alleged that Lungu is “creating a new 
dictatorship” (Luxmoore 2017). In the same period various informants in Western 
Province as well Lusaka openly raised the prospect of “civil war”, something previously 
unheard of in post-independence Zambia. 
 
Conclusion 
We have found no evidence to suggest that the cases of Lozi separatism in Namibia and 
Zambia are in any meaningful way directly linked beyond a few isolated expressions of 
mutual solidarity in the past. There has been no ethnically motivated pan-Lozi separatist 
cause since independence. While the two cases are related through their shared historical 
roots, we have argued that the trajectories and aims of separatists in both countries are 
fundamentally different in a number of aspects, which allow for fruitful comparison. 
Today’s Western Province includes the historical centres of the Lozi kingdom’s power 
while the area of Caprivi/Zambezi was in the precolonial period a peripheral and at times 
volatile province of Bulozi. Although Lewanika had established more firm control over 
Caprivi, the area’s population had at best a weak allegiance to the kingdom. When the 
 
 
opportunity for a closer linkage occurred in 1909, they were not unhappy to dissociate 
from Lozi power, especially since the maintenance of daily relations across the colonial 
border was, at least initially, not impeded. Separate administrative arrangements for the 
rest of the colonial period consolidated these differences. 
 
Decades apart, the different circumstances of the negotiated processes of decolonisation 
in Zambia and the armed liberation struggle for Namibia have resulted in different 
separatist claims of ‘betrayal’ and goals aiming towards the establishment of a more 
autonomous, self-governing authority. The factual status of the two 1964 agreements is 
hardly comparable: While one is a fully established detailed legal document bearing the 
signatures of the former colonial power and the leader of Zambia’s incoming postcolonial 
government, the claimed but hitherto unproven existence of the other between SWAPO 
and CANU is at best a disputed anecdotal footnote of the liberation struggle, and quite 
possibly a re-invention of historical facts to serve a vested interest. It definitely directly 
contradicts the written wish of CANU founder Simbwaye who in 1968 explicitly rejected 
the idea of secession/separate independence of Caprivi from the rest of Namibia. The 
declared primary objective of Lozis in Zambia has, apart from statements made by radical 
factions or at the height of severe tensions, not been secession but the inclusion of 
Barotseland/Western Province in Zambia as a semi-autonomous region with special 
privileges, and therefore not entirely unrealistic. In contrast, the Caprivi secessionists’ 
goal to ‘liberate’ their territory and create their own sovereign state was highly 
unrealistic, not only considering the size, location and resources of the area, but 
especially given the fact that a considerable share of the population within the 
Caprivi/Zambezi Region is actually very clearly in support of the Namibian government 
and its firm stance against the secessionists. But even among those, as the protest against 
the new name of the region seems to suggest, are many who have identified with being 
‘Caprivians’. 
 
Both cases examined in this chapter contain strong elements of national, regional and 
interpersonal political issues that have nothing to do with separatism being played out on 
a national stage. The postcolonial politics of recognizing traditional leaders, the Mafwe-
 
 
Masubiya dispute and Muyongo’s own personal history are as much part of the Caprivi 
secessionist story as Zambian party politics, the factional in-fighting within BRE, and 
competition within the spectrum of more radical advocates for secession are elements and 
drivers of the Barotseland issue. While these make comparison between the two cases 
interesting, the issues at hand are not factors uniting the two movements behind a 
common cause. 
 
Finally, there are important differences in the way the post-colonial state authorities in 
both countries have reacted to expressions of separatist agendas. Although the 
Barotseland case has elements of violent confrontation, both central government and 
BRE have so far always allowed room for negotiation. The overall more tranquil manner 
in which the Barotseland issue has been argued by BRE and handled by all central 
governments so far is consistent with Zambia’s peacefully negotiated independence 
transition and postcolonial history. The inverse assessment of the same facts, of course, 
would be that the issue at hand never seems to get settled one way or the other, and 
events since 2016 have even put Zambia’s long-term legacy of peaceful democratic 
transition and governance in question. In contrast, the SWAPO government’s harshly 
coercive reaction to the secessionists in 1999 left no room for negotiation. This in itself 
and the judicial debacle of the excessively long high treason trials have raised questions 
as to how committed SWAPO is to the principles of rule of law and democratic process. 
SWAPO’s way of dealing with the Caprivi secession has ultimately led to the same result 
as in the Zambian case: The issues at hand never appear to fully go away and instead 
keep poisoning the political climate, on a local, regional and national level in both 
countries. 
 
This last point motivates us to add to our analysis a note of caution. From various other 
cases of political dispute and indeed secessionism in Africa (and elsewhere) it is evident 
that historical facts are a rather fluid commodity. Collective memory, the interpretation of 
facts, and even the claims over their actual existence can change significantly over time. 
So far, the sporadic occurrence of ‘hot’ separatist action in Western Province and the 
Caprivi/Zambezi region, against a background of simmering discontent, have been 
 
 
largely out of synch. But if the socioeconomic causes as well as the handling of the 
political issues by both the Namibian and Zambian central governments were to 
aggravate grievances in both regions simultaneously at some point in the future, there 
may well be scope for a pan-Lozi separatist cause to become articulated. 
 
Who is likely to articulate it? Judging from past events in both case study regions, these 
would probably be educated persons with affiliations to what is left of the Lozi system of 
‘traditional’ authority, and who have been cut out of the deals which have led their fellow 
- or rival - compatriots to buy into supporting the central state. They would need to be 
able to mobilize sufficient support among disenchanted youths to back their arguments 
with any significant concrete action. If the socioeconomic situation in both regions does 
not improve tangibly, there should be no shortage of those, especially if access to and 
control over the local natural resource base would promise a better living. 
 
Are they likely to succeed? We do not think so, if “success” is defined as “accomplishing 
secession”. But if those who articulate the secessionist argument see a chance that this 
may force the central state authorities to do anything else but ignoring them, then getting 
noticed may well be good enough a reason for them to keep the secessionist demand and 
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i The terms Lozi and Barotse are synonymous. 
ii In the Lozi administrative hierarchy the Ngambela is the most senior councillor who 
communicates decisions between the Litunga and the khuta, as well as the public. In 
obvious relation to the Westminster Model, he is often referred to as “Prime Minister”. 
iii The exact number is disputed but this is the verifiable minimum number of casualties. 
iv WP: 2010 Zambia national census; Caprivi: 2011 Population and Housing Census. 
v The English name of the document is ‘Anglo-German Agreement of 1890’. 
vi Anglo-German agreement of 1890, Article III. 2. 
vii The population of the area referred to the place as ‘Luhonono’ and in August 2013 the 
Namibian government announced that this would replace ‘Schuckmannsburg’ as its 
official name.  
viii Two of these groups claimed autonomous chieftaincies in the post-independence 
period and their official recognition by the SWAPO government infuriated the core 
leadership of the Mafwe.  
ix Kennneth Kaunda in a speech at Lealui on 6 August 1964, cited in Sumbwa (2000, 
114). 
x Silozi is used for regular administrative proceedings, Siluyana for royal and ceremonial 
affairs. 
xi MP Mrs Judith Hart http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1966-12-
13a.227.9&s=barotse#g229.4 
xii In 1963 the South African government published the Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry into South West African Affairs, commonly known as the Odendaal Report after 




                                                                                                                                  
best ways to promote the socioeconomic development of Namibia’s black majority 
population, but it is widely regarded as an attempt to fend off anti-Apartheid critics. 
xiii Muyongo served as SWAPO Representative in Zambia (1964-'65), Educational 
Secretary (1966-'70), and Vice-President (1970-‘80). 
xiv The said letter was only discovered in 2017 in the Zambian National archives. The 
authors wish to thank Dag Henrichsen from the Baseler Afrika Bibliographien for making 
it available. 
xv http://www.caprivivision.com/who-has-the-power-to-revive-canu/ 
xvi Muyongo was the DTA Vice President from 1987 until 1992 and DTA President from 
1992 to 1999. http://www.klausdierks.com/Biographies/Biographies_M.html. Accessed 
30 June 2008. 
xvii As Soiri (2002, 200) notes, it is difficult to establish whether politics entered into 
ethnicity or vice versa. 
xviii The overall figures slightly differ according to sources and cannot be verified beyond 
any doubt. As the report also concludes: “Many have been tortured, and the state now 
faces potentially huge civil claims from the 43 men set free by the court after spending 13 
years in jail.” See also The Namibian of 2 February 2002 and of 16 June 2007, reporting 
on the claims of some of the accused to be ‘Caprivians’ and not ‘Namibians’ and hence 
refusing to accept the jurisdiction of the Namibian courts. 
xix Examples include a pro-secessionist opinion piece published in Caprivi Vision 1 
September 2005, the controversy over the revival and subsequent banning of the United 
Democratic Party (UDP) (The Namibian, 28 July and 8 September 2006; Allgemeine 




                                                                                                                                  
that this (hitherto undisclosed) document proves that the 1964 CANU-SWAPO merger 
was agreed on the condition that Caprivi would become an independent state separate 
from Namibia (The Namibian, 24 January 2007), the re-installment of CANU by locals 
and the repeated public claims by accused and acquitted high treason suspects that 
Caprivi is historically ‘not part of Namibia’ (The Namibian, 2 February 2005; 17 January, 
17 April and 14 June 2007 respectively). 
xx http://www.caprivifreedom.com/news.i?cmd=view&nid=1198 






xxiii The ruling party’s handling of the SWAPO detainee issue and the National Society 
for Human Rights and, the emergence of opposition parties Congress of Democrats and 
Rally for Democracy and Progress are prominent examples. 
xxiv “Reader’s Letter.” 2008. The Namibian, accessed at: 
http://www.namibian.com.na/2008/March/letters/08ED201395.html 








                                                                                                                                  
xxix http://www.ukzambians.co.uk/home/2012/02/28/president-satas-reaction-to-barotse-
report-a-u-turn-or-a-consciously-calculated-electoral-deception/?695d7100 
xxx http://www.barotseland.info/Freedom_Resolution_2012.htm 
